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The paper studies the impact of homophily on the optimal strategies of a monopo-
list, whose marketing campaign of new product relies on a word of mouth communica-
tion. Homophily is a tendency of people to interact more with those who are similar to
them. In the model there are two types of consumers embedded into a social network,
which dier in friendship preferences and desirable design of product. Consumers can
learn about the product directly from an advertisement or from their neighbors. The
monopolist chooses the product design and price to in
uence a pattern of communi-
cation among consumers. We nd a number of results: (i) for low levels of homophily
the product attractive to both types of consumers is preferred to specialized products;
(ii) the price elasticity is increasing in homophily; (iii) an increase in the homophily
benets both the monopolist and consumers; and (iv) the product attractive to both
types may be optimal even if the monopolist obtains prots only from sales to one
type of consumers.
JEL Classication numbers: D21, D42, D60, D83, L11, L12
Keywords: networks, word of mouth, viral marketing, homophily, diusion, social
networks, random graphs, monopoly, pricing strategy, product design, marketing, ad-
vertisement
1 Introduction
In the last decade word of mouth (WOM hereafter) and viral marketing have received a
considerable amount of attention from mass-media and the scientic community as ecient
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1marketing tools (see for instance Campbell, 2009, Goyal and Galeotti, 2007, Leskovec et al.
2007, and Iribarren and Moro, 2007). The idea that a company can recruit consumers to
advertise its products for free is really exciting. The WOM marketing takes an advantage
of the natural human's inclination to spread information. A recent study by Reichheld
(2003) shows that willingness of consumers to recommend a company to their friends not
just augments sales, but by far is the best predictor of a company's growth.
Apart from being ecient when it works, performance of a WOM campaign is quite
uncertain. A report by Riley and Wigder (2007) from Jupiter Research reveals that only
15% of viral campaigns are considered to be successful, moreover 55% of companies planned
to reduce the use of this tactics next year. This raises the question why companies that
face the same network of consumers show so dierent performance in terms of success
of WOM campaigns? In the paper we argue that volatile behavior of WOM marketing
campaigns at least partially can be explained by a phenomenon known as \homophily".
Homophily is a tendency of people to interact more with those who are similar to them,
which has been documented at least since Aristotle's time.1,2
Our paper contributes to the WOM literature in two dimensions. First and most
importantly, the paper introduces homophily into the network upon which WOM spreads
and studies its impact on the optimal strategy of the monopolist. The notion of homophily
enriches network structure by specifying a probability of friendship relationships among
groups of consumers. Second, the paper extends the monopolist's problem by including
product design that aects further WOM communication. To the author's best knowledge
product design has not been the subject of academic research in WOM framework.
The description of the model is following. There is a monopolist that introduces a
new product to an initially uninformed population of heterogeneous consumers of two
types. Consumers are embedded into a social network, which is represented by a random
graph with an arbitrary degree distribution. Across types, consumers dier in friendship
preferences and desirable design of the product. Within types, consumers dier in a
willingness to pay for the product. We model consumers friendship preferences by a linking
bias towards types, which represents homophily of the society. Consumers communicate
with their friends and learn about the existence of the product from neighbors who already
have acquired it. The monopolist knows the degree distribution and homophily level of
the society and strategically chooses the price and design of the product. To induce sales
the monopolist advertises the product directly to an innitesimal part of the population
and the rest of the population is expected to nd out about the product through WOM
communication.
1In Aristotles Rhetoric and Nichomachean Ethics, he noted that people \love those who are like
themselves" (Aristotle 1934, p. 1371).
2The term homophily appeared in the sociological literature for the rst time in Lazarsfeld and Mertons
(1954) who also quoted the proverbial expression - \birds of a feather 
ock together," which has summarized
homophily ever since.
2Our analysis begins by examining a necessary conditions on a network structure such
that WOM can spread over a signicant proportion of the population3. This was a case
of such remarkable examples of WOM campaigns as diusion of Hotmail accounts4 and
the advertising campaign of tiny budget movie \The Blair Witch Project"5. We nd that
in the case of sparse networks a suciently high level of homophily is a necessary for a
successful WOM campaign. High levels of homophily imply that preferences of connected
consumers are correlated, which allows the monopolist to develop the product attractive
for longer chains of connected consumers.
Next, we turn to the optimal design of the product. The commonly employed assump-
tion in the diusion literature is that a message to be spread in a network is given, and
main focus is upon the eect of network structure on its propagation (for a survey see
Geroski, 2000). In contrast, we assume an active role of the monopolist. In the model the
monopolist designs a message to the network by choosing the price and characteristic of
the product. In our base-line model we nd that for suciently high levels of homophily,
when people mostly interact with those who are similar to them, specialized products
designed to target needs of one type of consumers are optimal. However, for suciently
low levels of homophily, the product attractive for both types of consumers is preferred to
specialized design even if there is no cost of producing more than one product. The latter
happens, since the majority of links connect consumers of dierent types and to insure
spreading the product should be attractive to both types.
The sociological literature on homophily adopts a view that diversity of individual's
contacts is a socially desirable property per se (e.g. Moody, 2001). Although this assertion
could be supported by evidence, no rigorous analysis has been made. Perhaps surprisingly,
in our model social welfare is increasing in the level of homophily. The result comes from
informational and monetary benets for consumers generated by an increase in the level
of homophily. Informational benets consist in a higher awareness of consumers about the
product. Monetary benets come from a lower price charged by the monopolist, which
converts a higher awareness of the product into a higher volume of sales.
There is a popular idea in business and academic literature that focusing advertisement
eorts on a group of consumers is the ecient strategy. We show that it is indeed true -
an advertisement strategy of targeting consumers of one group is optimal. However, the
same does not always hold for the product design even when advertisement is targeted to
one group. In the case when the society exhibits low levels of homophily the optimality
of product specialization depends on the density of a social network. If the density is
low then the expected demand triggered per advertisement is small and the monopolist
specializes on a group of consumers targeted by the advertisement. If the network density
3In the network literature this phenomenon is known as a global cascade
4Hotmail spent a mere 50,000 dollars on traditional marketing and still grew from zero to 12 million
users in 18 months.
5A movie released in 1999 with principal photography budget ranging from $20,000 to $25,000.
3is suciently high then it is optimal for the monopolist to choose compromise design. This
strategy sacrices some initial adopters from the targeted group, but insures that initial
acquisition leads to higher level of WOM communication.
A term \freakonomics" has rmly entered to vocabularies of many economists. The
popular book of the same name6 with over 3 million copies sold worldwide gained popular-
ity not only among a general public, but became well known in the academic community
(e.g. DiNardo, 2006, DiNardo 2007, Rubinstein, 2006). The case of \Freakonomics" is
not unique. One can recall such examples as \Linked: The New Science of Networks" on
networks by Barab asi, \The Selsh Gene" on evolution by Richard Dawkins etc. All these
books provoked numerous discussions in the academic circles, while the primary audience
was the general public. In
uenced by this phenomenon, we consider the monopolist that
is interested only in one type of consumer (for instance the academic community). We
show that designing a product attractive to both types of consumers may be the optimal
strategy, even though monopolist benets only from one type.
1.1 Related Literature
In this section we relate our paper to two streams of the networks literature. The rst
one studies strategic diusion of information in networks with underlying assumption that
nodes are matched randomly (see, for instance, Campbell, 2009, Goyal and Galeotti, 2007,
Galeotti and Mattozzi, 2008). The second stream of the literature studies the impact of
homophily on various processes unfolding on networks (for instance Golub and Jackson,
2009, Van der Leij et al., 2009, Buhai and Van der Leij, 2008 and Valat, 2009). Our paper
bridges these two streams in a simple model, which studies the impact of social structure,
given by the homophily, on the diusion of information. The model allows us to yield a
number of insights into how homophily shapes optimal strategies of the monopolist and
in
uences a social welfare.
The two recent papers studying strategic diusion of information that are most re-
lated to our research are Campbell (2009) and Goyal and Galeotti (2007). Campbell
(2009) studies the optimal pricing and advertisement strategies of a monopolist when con-
sumers are engaged in WOM communication. Goyal and Galeotti (2007) study general
model of the strategic diusion, where they distinguish between level of interaction and
content of interaction. In their paper, the level of interaction is characterized by a de-
gree distribution, while content of interaction is a way in which actions of others aect
individual incentives. There are two key dierences between these papers and our paper.
First, we extend existing models by relaxing the random matching assumption and study
how such intrinsic property of a network as who is connected to whom aects strategic
diusion of information. Second, to our best knowledge, we are the rst to consider the
6The full title of the book: \Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Every-
thing".
4optimal design of the product in the presence of WOM communication.
The recent paper from the second stream of literature Golub and Jackson (2009) studies
how dierent mechanisms of communication operating through a network are aected by
homophily of the society. The principal dierence of our paper is that in our setup the
monopolist (the sender of a message) takes an active role and in
uences WOM spreading
by choosing the design of the product.
Within a broader literature that considers epidemic diusion (Newman, 2002; Sander
et al., 2002) our paper contributes to the analysis of multi-type networks with homophily
by extending the Newman's generating functions approach. In particular, we consider the
case when node is operational (is able to transmit information further in the network)
with some probability, which depends on a type of the node.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model of
the strategic diusion. In section 3 we derive the expected size of cascade of sales per
advertisement. Section 4 presents the main results on the optimal price and design of the
product and considers welfare implications of homophily. Section 5 examines the optimal
product design and advertisement strategy when the monopolist can target advertisement
by types of consumers. Section 6 considers robustness of the obtained results to a variation
in the shape of preference frontier. Section 7 studies the optimal strategy of the monopolist
that is interested only in one group of consumers. Section 8 considers the case of a global
cascade of sales. Finally, Section 9 outlines avenues for future research and concludes.
2 Model
In this section we formally present the model, which consists of three main blocks: network
structure, consumer preferences and monopolist problem.
2.1 Network Structure
There is a continuum of consumers of two types A and B, which are embedded into
undirected social network. Consumers of type A constitute measure 
 of the population
and the rest are consumers of type B. We focus on the case with consumers of two types
because it provides basic intuitions and insights, while keeping an analysis transparent7.
The network is represented by a random graph characterized by a degree distribution
p(k) and probabilities of ties among types of consumers (A;B). The parameter i is the
probability that a randomly chosen link of a consumer of type i leads to a consumer of
the same type and with complementary probability to consumer of another type. Thus
links of a consumer can be partitioned into two sets: links to consumers of the same type
7For example, the case of consumers of three types with the third type that is not interested in the
product is the same as the case of two types with a corrected degree.
5and links to consumers of another type. The probability that a consumer of type i with k
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A randomly selected consumer of type A with probability p(k) has k links, k(1   A)
of which connect her to consumers of type B. Taking the expectation we nd that on
average consumer of type A has z1(1   A) links to consumers of type B, where z1 is
expected number of rst neighbors. Multiplying obtained expression by the measure of
consumers of type A in the population we obtain total number of links of type AB, which
is 
z1(1   A). By analogy a number of links of type BA is equal to (1   
)z1(1   B).
Using the fact that the graph is undirected and number of links of type AB should be equal
to the number of links of type BA we arrive to the equality 
(1   A) = (1   
)(1   B).
Solving for B we obtain:





(1   A) (2)
Therefore, without loss of generality, in the case of two types of consumers we have
just one parameter  = A that characterizes linking preferences of all consumers. The
parameter  represents a level of homophily of the society, since it species the probability
of friendship relationships among consumers of the same type, for both types.
It is important to underline that friendship relationships among consumers are formed
on the basis of many parameters such as geographical proximity, common interests and
so on. A network formation process itself is beyond a scope of this paper. In the analysis
we assume that the network of social contacts is exogenously given, and is the same for
all products in question. The spreading of WOM in the network for dierent types of
products varies due to dierences in homophily level that the society exhibits towards
these products.
Figure 1 illustrates 3 dierent networks with the same degree distribution where all
nodes preserve the same connectivity. The only parameter that changes is the level of ho-
mophily of the society. As one can observe, depending on  networks range from perfectly
mixed to two separated graphs, where consumers of type A are completely disjoint from
consumers of type B.
To avoid an ambiguity we introduce some key denitions concerning a measurement
of homophily level. A benchmark case that we will use extensively is the case when links
6(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: All three graphs have nodes with the same number of neighbors, however they
dier in the homophily level. In (a) consumers are linked only to consumers of another
type,  = 0; in (b) we have random mixing of consumers,  = 0:5; in (c) consumers exhibit
extreme homophily,  = 1.
among consumers are formed with the uniform probability independently of a type.
Denition 1. The friendship ties in the society are randomly matched if  = 
.
We can think about a network of detergent consumers as an example of a network with
random matching. A plausible assumption would be that preference towards a liquid or
powdered detergent is not important itself for forming ties among consumers and thus we
may think that consumers of detergent are matched randomly.
In the sociological literature, a tendency of friendship to be biased towards own type
beyond the relative proportion in the population is referred to as \inbreeding homophily"
(see, for example Coleman, 1958, Marsden, 1987 and McPherson et al., 2001). In this
case the proportion of links going to consumers of the same type is higher than otherwise
would be implied by random matching.
Denition 2. The society exhibits the inbreeding homophily if  > 

There are also networks in which a situation can be reversed and social ties are biased
towards dierent-type relationships (e.g. network of sexual contacts).
Denition 3. The society exhibits a heterophily if  < 

To illustrate ideas let us consider examples of random matching and network which
exhibits homophily. If consumers are matched randomly with a uniform probability then
consumer of type A has on average the proportion  = 
 of neighbors of the same type.
At the same time the expression (2) implies that the average proportion of neighbors of
consumer of type B of the same type is B = (1   
), which equals to proportion of
consumers of type B in the population. In the case when consumers of type A are linked
more often among themselves as compared to the case of random matching,  > 
, by
expression (2) the same applies to the consumers of type B, since B > (1   
).
72.2 Consumer Preferences
Consumers, in addition of having linking preferences, dier in two other respects. First,
across types consumers dier in preferences towards a product design. Consumers of type
A prefer one characteristic of the product, while consumers of type B are interested in the
opposite features. Second, within types consumers dier in a reservation price  Pj they are
willing to pay for the product and the minimal level of desirable characteristic  wj, which
induces them to buy the product.
More formally, in the model two variables aect the decision of consumers: the price
P 2 [0;1] and characteristic of product w 2 [0;1]. For concreteness, a consumer j of type
A buys the product if characteristic is higher than the threshold level w   wj and the
price is lower than the reservation price P   Pj. In contrast, a consumer l of type B buys
the product if w   wl and P   Pl.
We assume that within a type the reservation price and characteristic threshold are
distributed according to fi(  w;  P) probability density function. Hence, a randomly chosen
consumer j of type A, which is aware of the product with a characteristic w and price P
buys it with the probability:





fA(  w;  P)d  wd  P
And similarly a randomly selected consumer l of type B, which knows about the
product buys it with the probability:





fB(  w;  P)d  wd  P
To simplify the analysis for the major part of it we assume that the threshold char-
acteristic and threshold price distributed independently and identically according to the
uniform distribution U[0;1] for both types. This implies that fA(  w;  P) = fB(  w;  P) = 1
and probabilities to buy the product are given by the following expressions:
(
qA = (1   P)w
qB = (1   P)(1   w)
For given price the system describes a preference frontier, depicted in Figure 2, which
encompasses all admissible pairs of probabilities for two types of consumers to buy the
product. By choosing the product design the monopolist identies a probability pair
(qA;qB) and xes network of potential buyers. The network of potential buyers consists of
all consumers that would buy the product if they know about it. An increase in P shifts
frontier inwards, simultaneously decreasing probabilities to buy the product for two types.
In the paper we will encounter two special types of the product design.
8P¯
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Figure 2: On the left hand side preferences frontier with characteristic of the product
being marked by circle. On the right hand side implied social network, with probability
to buy the product shown by intensity of the color.
Denition 4. The design is called symmetric if the product characteristic w is such that
two types of consumers acquire the product with identical probabilities, qA = qB.
In the case described above, the symmetric design is represented by w = 1
2.
Denition 5. The design is called specialized if the product characteristic w 2 f0;1g,
which implies that only one type of consumers acquires the product.
These two types of design represent dierent marketing strategies. A symmetric design
intends to satisfy needs of both types of consumers, without giving preference to any of
them, while the specialized one focuses on one type and neglects the other.
2.3 Monopoly Problem
The monopolist develops new product and introduces it to consumers who are engaged in
WOM communication. In the model the monopolist chooses design of the product w and
price P to maximize prots. To induce sales the monopolist advertises the product directly
to an innitesimal part of the population. The rest of the population is expected to nd
out about the product from neighbors who have acquired the product. The diusion of
information stops when there are no new acquisitions of the product.
The network literature usually distinguish two possible scenarios of information spread-
ing. In the rst an information propagates to some nite number of consumers and than
stops, while in the second an information continues to propagate unboundedly. Let us
give the precise denition of the latter case:
Denition 6. We say that the global cascade of sales arises if ultimately some non-
innitesimal proportion of the population buys the product.
9Depending wether the global cascade of sales arises or not there are two techniques
available to study information diusion. The main results of the paper are developed for
the case of nite sales, while in Section 8 we study the case of global cascade.
3 Cascade of Sales
In this section we derive the expression for the expected size of cascade of sales generated
by one advertisement and study its properties. In the derivation of the expression we rely
on the generating functions approach for multi-type nodes based on Newman (2003). The
main focus of Newman's paper is heterogeneity of types in terms of degree distribution.
Our paper adopts dierent perspective. While two types of consumers enjoy the same
degree distribution, they dier in their willingness to purchase the product. This implies
that a further propagation of information depends on the way in which dierent types are
linked.
3.1 Generating Functions Approach
In the eld of complex networks, generating functions were introduced by Newman et
al. (2001) and since then have been widely used. A generating function encapsulates
all the information about degree distribution, and thus completely characterizes a random
network. The generating functions allow us to calculate various local and global properties,
such as average degree, average size of component, etc.
In the case of nodes of two types we need to dene generating functions associated with
degree distribution and homophily level of each type of consumer. Recall that probability
of having j links to consumers of the same type for a randomly selected consumer of type
i with k links is given by Pr(J = jjk;i), which is described in (1). The probability
pseudo-generating function Fi








Pr(J = jjk;i)xjyk j (3)
This is a polynomial expression in x and y where the coecient on xjyk j is the
probability that a randomly chosen consumer of type i buys the product, given that she
has j links to consumers of the same type and k   j links to consumers of another type.
These functions are known as pseudo-generating due to the fact that for x = y = 1
they do not sum to 1. This happens since not all consumers buy the product. Actually,
Fi
0(1;1) = qi, which is the probability that a randomly chosen consumer of type i buys
the product given that she is aware of it.
Using the binomial identity we can perform summation over j and the expression





p(k)qi[ix + (1   i)y]k
Note, when x = y, we obtain the same generating function as in the case when there






This inheritance allows us to calculate a number of useful properties applying the same
techniques as in the case of nodes of one type. Taking the k-th derivative and normalizing
by the factor k!Fi













A moment of the degree distribution of order m can be calculated by deriving the






















Apart of the characteristics intrinsic to all random graphs we also can calculate proper-
ties tailored to a type of consumer. For example, a degree distribution of links connecting












= Pr(J = jjk;i)  p(k)
A degree distribution of a neighbor of a randomly chosen consumer plays the important
role in the analysis to come. Note it is not the same as the degree distribution of a randomly
selected consumer, since the more links a consumer has the more often she is selected as
a neighbor. A consumer with k links is found k-times more often through friends than
a consumer with one link. Therefore, the probability to have a neighbor with k links is
proportional to kp(k). After normalization we obtain that the degree distribution of a








Using the degree distribution of neighboring consumer we can write a generating func-





(k)qi[ix + (1   i)y]k =
1
z1










The important characteristic that aects the process of information diusion or spread-
ing of a disease in the network is the excess degree of a neighboring node. That is to say
we want to nd generating functions that characterize the probability that a neighboring
consumer of type i has k links apart of the link which led us to this consumer. The excess
degree distribution is given by:
^ (k) = (k + 1) =
(k + 1)p(k + 1)
z1






















The generating function characterizing the degree distribution of second neighbors who




1(x;y) + (1   i) ^ Fsi




where s i denotes the type of consumer dierent from type i.
Using this expression we can calculate z2, the expected number of second neighbors of
a randomly selected node. Since we are interested in the expected number of neighbors
regardless of type we put y = x. To account for all neighbors in the following calculation
we assume the probability to buy product for two types qA and qB equal to 1. This implies
that ^ Fi
1(x;y) = ^ Fsi
1 (x;y), since now there is no dierence between consumers of two types.






























8In the case when q
i = 1 for i 2 fA;Bg all generating functions evaluated at 1 are equal to 1.
12In the following analysis we assume that the underlying conditions are such that no
giant component of consumers who buy the product arises. The case of giant cascade
of sales is considered in Section 8. Let us denote by Hi
1(x;y) generating functions char-
acterizing probability distribution of size of nite components of buyers, induced by an
information 
ow through a randomly chosen link to a consumer of type i. If the consumer
of type i does not buy the product component is empty (since the information does not




(k)qi = 1   ^ Fi
1[1;1], i 2 fA;Bg
However, with complementary probability a consumer with k contacts buys the prod-
uct and relays the information to neighbors. The further spread of information is subject to
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1 (x;y) = 1   ^ FB




where the leading factor x and y account for the fact that the rst visited consumer
buys the product.
On the basis of Hi
1(x;y) we can dene Hi
0(x;y) generating functions of size of buyers
components generated by advertisement to a randomly chosen consumer of type i. Since





0 (x;y) = 1   FA





0 (x;y) = 1   FB




As we have shown before the derivative of the generating function evaluated at the point
(1;1) gives us the rst moment of a distribution. That is why the number of consumers
who eventually buy the product if we advertise it to a randomly chosen consumer of type
i is the sum Hi
0x + Hi
0y evaluated at the point (1;1). Recall that in the population there
is proportion 
 of consumers of type A and 1   
 of type B. Thus if we advertise the
product to a randomly chosen consumer the expected number of purchases in vector form
is given by the expression:
s(qA;qB;;
;z1;z2) = (










Omitting further derivations to the appendix, the resulting expression is given by the
following lemma:
13Lemma 1. The expected number of consumers who buy the product if the monopolist
advertises it to a randomly chosen consumer is given by an expression:
s(qA;qB;;
;z1;z2) = (











where z1 and z2 are expected numbers of rst and second neighbors correspondingly,
















qAA qA(1   A)
qB(1   B) qBB
!
Proof See appendix 
The rst term of the expression (





is the probability that a randomly
chosen consumer buys the product and transmits information further. The second term
consists of two parts. The rst part (
 1 
)F0
0 is a vector with components showing the
number of the rst neighbors of type A and type B who buy the product. The second




with components that represent number of purchases
generated by the 
ow of information through a randomly chosen link to a consumer of
type A and B.
Note that as in the epidemic diusion literature only rst two moments of degree dis-
tribution z1 and z2 are relevant for the propagation of cascade of sales. This substantially
reduces the amount of information about network structure that monopolist needs to know
to make the optimal decision.
In a special case when consumers of both types have the same preferences towards the
product and buy it with the same probability q the expression of cascade of sales reduces
to well known expression of the average size of component of operational nodes9:
s(qA;qB;;
;z1;z2)jqA=qB=q = q +
q2z1
1   q(z2=z1)
In this case size of sales cascade is independent of such network characteristics as
population composition 
 and homophily level . This points out that for homophily to
have the impact on diusion there should be a heterogeneity of types in terms of preferences
towards both the product and friendship relationships.
4 Main Results
We begin our analysis by establishing a condition under which the global cascade of sales
arises. With this condition in mind, we turn to the problem of the monopolist considering
9See Callaway et al. (2000)
14the case when sales are nite. We derive the optimal price and product design solving the
maximization problem in two steps. In the rst step we x the price and solve the problem
for the optimal design of the product. In the second step we allow the monopolist to re-
optimize with respect to the price. We complete our analysis by studying the implications
of homophily level for price elasticity of demand and social welfare.
4.1 Arise of the Global Cascade of Sales
A WOM marketing campaign is regarded as successful if it induces multiple sales per
advertisement. However, there are some exceptional cases when an information propa-
gates to a signicant part of the population. These were the case of movie advertisement
\The Blair Witch Project" and diusion of Hotmail accounts. In this section we identify
the condition under which the monopolist acting optimally can sell the product to non-
innitesimal part of the population. We consider two cases, when the price is endogenous
and forms part of the decision process of the monopolist and when price is exogenous.
From Lemma 1 we know that number of buyers of the product explodes when the
denominator det(I ^ F0







(1   A   B)  
z2
z1
(qAA + qBB)  0
In order not to favor any group of consumers in the following analysis we assume
that consumers are partitioned into two groups of equal sizes, thus consumers of type
A and B constitute half of the population. In this case the expression (2) implies that
A = B = . Substituting expressions for qA and qB and incorporating assumptions we















In the expression, degree distribution is summarized by the ratio of expected number
of second neighbors to expected number of rst neighbors. This ratio tells us how ecient
is a network in information diusion. In particular, it shows how many second neighbors
on average become aware of the product if a consumer shares the information with one of
her rst neighbor.
The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 1. For endogenous price P, if z2=z1  min

2; 1	
there exists non empty
set E(z2=z1;) such that for any (w;P) 2 E(z2=z1;) a global cascade of sales arises.
Proof See appendix 
15In the framework of one-type nodes a paper by Molloy and Reed (1995) for the rst
time derives the condition for appearance of the giant component of connected nodes,
which is z2=z1 > 1. In our case it is a necessary condition for a global cascade of sales to
occur. One can easily check that z2=z1 < 1 does not satisfy condition in Proposition 1,
since  2 [0;1]. Intuitively, for the information to spread unboundedly, there should exist
a giant component of connected consumers upon which spreading may take place.
The condition in Proposition 1 is stronger than z2=z1 > 1 since not all consumers
buy the product and consequently relay WOM further. One can separate the condition
into two parts: z2=z1  2 and z2=z1   1. The rst part of the condition tells us that
independently of homophily level , if z2=z1 is higher than 2 then a global cascade of sales
occurs. This part of the condition comes from the case when maximal spread of WOM is





, which mitigates dierences between nodes
and makes  irrelevant. Moreover, it resembles a condition from Callaway et al. (2000)
for the appearance of a giant component of operational nodes, z2=z1  1
p, where p is a
probability that a node is operational. In our model in the case of the symmetric design
p = w = 1
2, since all consumers buy the product with the same probability.
The second part of the condition comes from the case when  > 1
2 and the maximal
spread of WOM is attained when the monopolist chooses a specialized design (w 2 f0;1g).
In this case information propagates only via consumers of one type. To x ideas assume
that the monopolist chooses w = 1 and thus only consumers of type A buy the product.
The expected number of rst neighbors of type A is z1 and the expected number of
second neighbors of type A, which can be attained through type A consumers is 2z2.
Substituting these numbers into the condition from Molloy and Reed (1995) we obtain
z2=z1 >  1, which is exactly the same as the second part of the condition in Proposition
1.
In the analysis to come we also consider a case when the price is exogenously given
and the monopolist only chooses characteristic of the product w. The following lemma
establishes condition for the global cascade of sales to occur for exogenously given price:





non-empty interval [w;w], such that for any w 2 [w;w] a global cascade of sales arises.
Proof See appendix 
Not surprisingly, in the case of exogenous price the condition of appearance of giant
cascade of sales in the Lemma 2 is more strict, since not all consumers are willing to pay
the price P for the product.
4.2 Optimal Design
In this section we consider the problem of the monopolist who takes the price as given and
chooses the design of product to maximize prots. Without loss of generality we assume
16that a production cost of the product is zero. Thus prots are given by the product of the
price and size of sales cascade. In the case of an exogenously given price Lemma 2 implies




. Thus the monopolist prots
maximization problem subject to preferences frontier is the following:
max




s.t.: qA = (1   P)w
qB = (1   P)(1   w)
Before going to the results we develop some intuition. We already have seen the
importance of homophily level in the Lemma 2 . In the following exercise let us assume
that the society exhibits heterophily, which implies that nodes of type A are more often
connected to nodes of type B. Assume further that a consumer of type A has bought
the product. Since majority of her neighbors are of type B, a necessary condition for
further spread of the information is attractiveness of the product to consumers of type
B. However, once they buy the product, most of their neighbors are of type A and the
process reiterates. Thus we can conclude that for a suciently low homophily level the
optimal product design should be appealing to both groups of consumers. Assume now
that homophily is suciently high and consumers of both types have majority of their
links to the consumers of the same type. Would it be optimal to focus on consumers of
one type, and forget about others? The question is non-trivial, since there are components
of consumers of both types and if the monopolist focuses on one type all components of
another type will be out of reach.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2. For any exogenously given price P following holds:
(a) if  = 1
2 the function s() is horizontal line and all w 2 [0;1] are solutions to the
maximization problem.
(b) if  < 1
2 the function s() is quasi-concave and has its unique maximum at the point
w = 1
2.
(c) if  > 1
2 the function s() is quasi-convex and its unique minimum is at the point
w = 1
2 and maxima are situated at points w 2 f0;1g
Proof See appendix 




2 implies random mixing) the size of sales cascade is not aected by the product
characteristic w. That is why heterogeneity of consumers preferences towards the product
and towards linking both constitute key ingredients of the model.
17The Proposition 2 conrms our intuition for the case of low homophily levels and most
importantly states that the maximization problem has a threshold solution. More pre-
cisely, independently of a degree distribution and price, if  becomes higher than 1
2, the op-
timal product design abruptly changes from symmetric w = 1
2 to specialized w 2 f0;1g.
The explanation is the following: when  is higher than 1
2 the majority of consumer's
neighbors are of the same type as the consumer. That is why the design most attractive
for a randomly selected consumer is the one that induces the highest sales of the product
among her neighbors. The situation reiterates for every consumer that buys the product,
reinforcing the optimality of the specialized design.
The obtained result does not depend on a degree distribution or price, which makes it
easy to apply. The monopolist just needs to know whether homophily level of the society
is higher or lower than 1
2 to choose the optimal design of the product.
4.3 Demand
Incorporating the optimal design of the product into the expression for cascade of sales






















,  > 1
2
Note that for   1
2 the demand is independent of homophily level , since in this
case the optimal design is given by the symmetric characteristic w = 1
2. The symmetric
design implies that both types of consumers buy the product with the same probability and
mixing pattern does not matter. The following proposition summarizes main properties
of the demand function:
Proposition 3. The demand is given by the function Q(P;;z1;z2), which has following
properties:
(i) Q(P;;z1;z2) is continuous in  and for  > 1
2 is increasing and convex in .
(ii) Q(P;;z1;z2) is decreasing and convex in P.
(iii) A price elasticity of demand is increasing in , for  > 1
2.
Proof See appendix 
The rst result states that for homophily level  > 1
2 a classical demand (the demand
with the incorporated optimal design) increases in . In Proposition 2 we have seen that
for  > 1
2 the optimal design is specialized with characteristic w belonging to the set
f0;1g. In this case a randomly chosen consumer has the majority of neighbors of the same
type and a further increase of homophily increases this subset. To x ideas assume that
18w = 1 and P = 0. Thus if a consumer of type A gets the information about the product
she and all her neighbors of type A acquire the product. Thus an increase in homophily
level leads to a higher number of acquisitions in the neighborhood of a type A consumer.
The obtained result diers from intuitions of McPherson (2001), which argues that
for higher homophily levels, information 
ows are localized and status quo of individuals
tend to be maintained. We show that when further transmission of information depends
on the adoption decision, an increase in homophily may actually produce higher spread
of information. Higher levels of homophily induce a higher correlation of consumers'
preferences making it easier for the monopolist to design a product information of which
can penetrate further in the network.
The convexity part of the result (i) comes from the fact that an increase of homophily
expands a subset of neighbors of the same type in a neighborhood of consumer. Moreover,
each consequent increase of homophily operates upon the neighborhood of a higher number
of consumers, which acquire the product. This gives rise to increasing returns in terms of
number of buyers in homophily level.
The result (ii) has a similar nature as the result of convexity of demand in . A
price increase aects the decision of all consumers to acquire the product regardless of
their position in a chain of buyers. Let us consider an example when a consumer who is
situated earlier in a chain of buyers stops to acquire the product due to a price increase. In
this case the whole branch of consumers that has received information about the product
through this consumer stops to acquire the product. A further price increase has smaller
impact on the demand, since chains of buyers become shorter.
Having two previous results at hand we are equipped to understand the third one. The
result (i) implies that when  > 1
2 an increase in  leads to higher sales and awareness
of consumers about the product. Hence, a price increase aects decision of an increased
number of consumers, which translates into an increased price elasticity of demand.
4.4 Optimal Price
We have seen the solution of maximization problem with respect to the optimal design
of the product. In this subsection we relax the assumption of exogenous price and allow
the monopolist to re-optimize with respect to a price. The optimal product design is
independent of the price chosen by the monopolist, thus all results derived in the previous
sections hold for the optimal price as well. The monopolist maximizes prots and solves













In a price setting the monopolist faces usual trade-o: an increase in the price aug-
ments prots from each unit sold, but simultaneously decreases demand for the product.
19However, in the presence of WOM communication there is an additional informational
component of the trade-o. Since a consumer spreads information about the product only
if she acquires it, a price increase lowers product awareness of consumers. The properties
of the optimal pricing strategy are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The optimal price P for   1
2 is decreasing in the homophily level,
while for  < 1
2, P is independent of the homophily level. The optimal price P is always
lower than 1
2.
Proof See appendix 
The result is a direct consequence of the fact that the price elasticity of demand is
increasing in homophily level. As we have seen in Proposition 3 for  > 1
2 an increase
in homophily implies that more consumers become aware about the product, and sales
increase. The monopolist by reducing the price capture a higher fraction of informed
consumers. Proposition 4 implies that the informational component outweighs an increase
of prots per purchase generated by a higher price.
4.5 Social Welfare
Our model allows to address welfare implications of the homophily in explicit manner.
A majority of the literature on homophily adopts a view that diversity of contacts is a
socially desirable property per se (e.g. Moody, 2001). Although this assertion could be
supported by evidence, no rigorous analysis has been made. A recent paper by Currarini et
al. (2009) shows that welfare implications of homophily crucially depend on the structure
of consumers preferences. In the following analysis we consider welfare implications of
homophily in the framework of our model.





We already have seen that for   1
2, demand is increasing in homophily, and thus
increase in  shifts the demand curve upwards. This happens, since more consumers
become aware about the product. At the same time an increase in the homophily level by
Proposition 4 leads to lower price. As a consequence more consumers buy the product for
lower price and thus both eects lead to an increase in consumer surplus.
A producer surplus is the area below the price of the product and marginal cost curve
(MC) of producer. In our case MC = 0, which leads to the following expression for the
producer surplus:
PS(P();;z1;z2) = P()  Q(P();;z1;z2)
20Proposition 5. Both consumer surplus and monopolistic prots are increasing in the level
of homophily.
The Proposition 5 states that if information retransmission is subject to an adoption
decision then society is better-o when homophily level is high. There are two driv-
ing forces of the result. First, the optimally constructed message propagates better in
homogenous groups, which leads to an increase in awareness of consumers about the prod-
uct. Second, the price reduction is more eective in facilitating diusion of WOM in the
case of higher homophily levels. These two eects are benecial for both consumers and
the monopolist.
4.6 Example of Classical Random Graph
In further analysis we will often refer to a special case of network structure known as
a classical random graph. The notion of a random graph has been introduced by Paul
Erd~ os and Alfr ed R enyi and since then it is the most studied model of graphs. Nodes
connectivity in a random graph follows Poisson degree distribution and arises in innite
networks, where each node creates a link to any other node in the network with a uniform
probability.
In our case probability that a randomly selected link connects two consumers of the
same type is dierent from the probability that it connects consumers of dierent types.
One can think about a network of N consumers of two types, where each consumer creates
a link to any other consumer of the same type with probability
z1
N and to a consumer
of another type with the probability
(1 )z1
N . When N goes to innity we obtain innite
network that is characterized by two Poisson degree distributions. One for links among
consumers of the same type with the mean z1 and another for links among consumers of
dierent types with the mean (1 )z1. Recall, that the sum of two Poisson variables also
follows Poisson distribution with the mean equal to the sum of means. That is why overall
connectivity of a randomly chosen node follows Poisson distribution and the network is
classical random graph with average connectivity given by z1.
In the case of Poisson degree distribution the average connectivity z1 is a sucient
characteristic of the network, and z2 = z2
1. This property allows us to study the eect of
network density on the propagation of WOM and the optimal strategies of the monopolist.
As we already have seen the optimal design of the product does not depend on a
degree distribution and is given by the expression in Proposition 2. Incorporating relation























,  > 1
2
21Note that demand is continuous and does not depend on  when   1
2. In the
derivation we use the demand function for the case of  > 1
2. In order to get results for
the case of   1
2 one needs to substitute  = 1
2. Taking derivative with respect to z1 of





2(1   (1   P)z1)2 > 0
Solving maximization problem we obtain the expression for the optimal price,10,11















z1 ,  > 1
2
The derivative of the optimal price with respect to homophily level  is negative, the










To study an eect of the network density on the optimal price we derive the expression












The derivative is negative, which implies that the optimal price P is decreasing in
both average connectivity and homophily parameter .
Turning to welfare implications of homophily and using the same line of arguments as
we have outlined before one can show that an increase in z1 leads to a higher consumer
surplus. This happens since a denser network implies higher awareness of consumers about
the product. An increase in the network density also augments benets for the monopolist
of price reduction. These both eects benet consumers.
5 Targeted Advertisement
In the previous section we have considered the problem of the monopolist, which cannot
distinguish consumers by type. The monopolist, restricted by the anonymity assumption,
was advertising the product to a randomly chosen subset of the population. This for-
mulation is relevant for an advertisement through the mass media, when the monopolist




2 + 2P(1   z1) + z1   1 = 0.
11Condition of absence of a global cascade of sales in the case of the Poisson distribution is z1 <
minf2;
 1g.
22cannot control who is watching or hearing an advertisement. However, in the case of a
direct advertisement there is a possibility to target chosen group of consumers. For ex-
ample, monopolist that is interested in students' community, can advertise a product in a
university campus, etc.
In this section we are going to relax anonymity assumption and allow the monopolist
to observe types of consumers. More precisely, we assume that the monopolist chooses a
design of the product w and proportion  of consumers of type A in the subset that is
selected for advertisement. Note, before proportion of consumers of type A which were
receiving advertisement was xed exogenously at the level 
, which is proportion of nodes
of type A in the society. In the analytical part, for tractability of the problem, we assume





s.t.: qA = (1   P)w
qB = (1   P)(1   w)
The expression for sales cascade s(qA;qB;;;z1;z2) can be rewritten as a linear com-
bination of number of purchases resulted from an advertisement to consumer of type A
and of type B:   sA(qA;qB;;z1;z2) + (1   )  sB(qA;qB;;z1;z2). Given the linear
structure of the problem in terms of  it is easy to see that if qA 6= qB the optimal tar-
geting proportion has a corner solution. Namely, the solution depends whether a cascade
of sales induced by an advertisement is higher if we advertise to a consumer of type A or
of type B. In the case when qA = qB both types of consumers buy the product with the
same probability and thus all values of  on the interval [0;1] are optimal.
Proposition 6. Targeting one type of consumers for advertisement is always the optimal
strategy for the monopolist.
Since preference frontier is symmetric, without loss of generality we assume that the
monopolist targets consumers of type A and hence  = 1. Moreover, by symmetric nature
of the problem if  = 1 and some w is the solution then  = 0 and 1 w is a solution
too. For the following analysis we assume that  = 1.
The maximization problem with targeted advertisement for an arbitrary degree distri-
bution quickly becomes intractable. In the following analysis we focus on the commonly
employed structure of a network given by the classical random graph.
The intuition tells us that possibility of targeting of consumers for advertisement would
unavoidably brings bias towards characteristics of the product favorable for consumers of
targeted type. The bias itself can be of two forms. The rst form is that a threshold level
of homophily, which separates specialized design (w 2 f0;1g) and symmetric (w = 1
2)
23moves to a level lower than 1
2. The second form is that for  lower than new threshold




instead of being symmetric. The
following proposition shows that the both types of bias are present in the case of targeted
advertisement:
Proposition 7. In the case of the Poisson degree distribution and exogenously given






4(1 P)z1 , such that for
  ^ T(z1;P) the monopolist will advertise and specialize only on one type of consumers
( = 1 and w = 1). For  < ^ T(z1;P) the optimal advertisement strategy is still  = 1,
but the optimal characteristic is given by the following expression:
w =   
1   2  
p
(1   )(1   2)(1   (1   P)z1)[2 + (1   P)z1(1   2)]




Proof See appendix 
The success of WOM campaign to a high extend depends on the eectiveness of the
direct advertisement in inducing initial acquisitions of the product. In order to convert
consumers of type A, who receive direct advertisement, into initial adopters the monopolist
designs the product more attractive to them. The bias in the product design persists even
when the society exhibits heterophily ( < 1
2).
In the case of the Poisson distribution the rise in z1 implies a higher diusion of WOM
in the network, since there are more channels for information to spread on. In the case
when we approach the global cascade phase (z1 goes to 2(1   P) 1) the threshold level
^ T(z1;P) goes to 1
2 and the optimal characteristic for  < 1
2 is w = 1
2. Thus the optimal
design becomes exactly the same as in the case of non-targeted advertisement. In this
case the monopolist optimally sacrices some initial adopters, and design the product in
a way that WOM can penetrate further in the network.
The result implies that when we approach the global cascade phase the option to target
advertisement to some group of consumers does not in
uence neither the optimal design
of the product nor the demand. We regard this result as indication of robustness of the
optimal design strategy that we obtained in our base-line model.
6 Non-Linear Shape of the Preference Frontier
The previous analysis develops results for the case of a linear preference frontier. However,
one can think about many examples where a relationship between acquisition probabilities
for two groups of consumer is not linear. These situations occur when attractiveness of the
product for two types of consumers varies non-linearly in a characteristic. For example,
longer guarantee on the product is attractive for both types, while red color of the product
24may be very welcome by one group of consumers and be unattractive for an another. In
this situations the shape of the frontier can vary from concave to convex depending on a
product in question.
In this section we want to address the robustness of obtained results to a change in
curvature of the preference frontier that the monopolist faces. We consider CES functional
form of the preference frontier, which allows to model variety of shapes. Thus probabilities






= (1   P)r
By varying the parameter r we can obtain shapes of the preferences frontier that
include a bend inward circle (r = 0:562), a linear function (r = 1), a bend outward circle
(r = 2) and everything in between.
6.1 Arise of the Global Cascade of Sales
Similarly to analysis in the case of a linear frontier it is important to establish conditions
under which a global cascade of sales occurs. An essential parameter for appearance of
the global cascade of sales is r, the degree of curvature. For example, if r goes to 1, as
we know from properties of CES function, the frontier becomes a step function and the
best design of the product is w = 1 which implies qA = qB = 1   P. In this case two
types of consumers are fully satised with a product design and thus eectively there is
only one type of consumers. The condition for appearance of global cascade in this case
is well known from the networks literature, namely z2
z1  1
1 P .
For arbitrary values of r the condition of existence of a global cascade is given by the
following inequality:







(1   2)   (1   P)
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Due to an arbitrary power of the polynomial equation it is impossible to solve it
analytically, however we can identify a broad set of parameters such that a global cascade
of sales occurs. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8. In the case of CES preference frontier with a curvature parameter r,
global cascade of sales arises if z2=z1 > 2
1
r or  > ^ NL(z2=z1;r;P), where











Proof See appendix 
256.2 Problem of the Monopolist
The subsection consists of two parts: analytical and numerical. In the analytical part we
focus on the case of an exogenous price and Poisson degree distribution and nd conditions
such that symmetric and specialized designs are solutions to the maximization problem.
In the second part we endogenize a price and solve monopolist problem numerically for
an arbitrary degree distribution.
Similarly to the analysis in Section 5 we assume that the degree distribution is Poisson
and price is given exogenously. The monopolist faces a non-linear preferences frontier and
chooses design of the product to maximize prots. The monopolist solves the following
maximization problem:
max




s.t.: qA = (1   P)w
qB = (1   P)(1   wr)
1
r
We identify homophily level such that symmetric and specialized designs are solutions.
The results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 9. For an exogenous price and Poisson degree distribution following holds:









r if  < ^ NL(r;P;z1) and otherwise the optimal design is specialized
w 2 f0;1g.




r if  < ^ NL(r;P;z1) otherwise







Proof See appendix 
The Proposition 9 states that the optimal design has similar structure as in the case
of linear preferences frontier. More precisely, for bend inwards frontier (r  1) only
symmetric and specialized designs are optimal. They are separated by new threshold
value ^ NL(r;P;z1). For bend outwards frontier (r > 1) and suciently low levels of ,
symmetric design is optimal. However for high levels of  the solution gradually changes
from the symmetric to specialized.
In the case of bend outward shape of the frontier (r > 1) the optimal design is biased
towards the symmetric design. The explanation is following: while the corner solutions
are still as attractive as they were in the problem with r = 1 (endpoints are xed), the
symmetric solution becomes more appealing. This happens since in the case of r > 1
by moving to the center of symmetry from qA = 1 we are gaining more of qB, while
26Figure 3: Diagram depicts a solution for the case of scale free distribution with pdf
Ck 3:34, where C is normalizing constant. In this case z1 = 1:23 and z2 = 1:77. Areas
represent: symmetric solution (blue), asymmetric (light yellow), specialized (yellow) and
area where a global cascade arises (red).
sacricing the same amount of qA as compared to the linear case. For the case when r < 1
the situation is reversed.
The threshold level of homophily ^ NL(r;P;z1) is increasing in z1. Thus the denser
is a network the more appealing becomes the symmetric design. The intuition is the
same as for the case of targeted advertisement. Dense network implies higher diusion of
information and to penetrate further the product should be appealing for both types.
To check robustness of the obtained result we consider a numerical solution of the
problem for the case of a scale free distribution. Figure 3 shows a diagram of the structure
of the solution. One can see from the diagram that for r < 1 we have similar results as
in a linear case. Namely, there is the threshold level of ^ NL(r;z1;z2;P) such that for  <
^ NL(r;z1;z2;P) the optimal solution is symmetric and for values of  > ^ NL(r;z1;z2;P)
the solution is specialized. In the case of r > 1 a structure stays the same but after
 = ^ NL(r;z1;z2;P) the solution gradually changes from symmetric to some intermediate







7 Targeting One Type of Consumers
In this section we address the problem of monopolist who has an interest only in one type
of consumers, for concreteness lets assume that this is type B. This situation could arise
if the monopolist believes that consumers dier in their post purchasing behavior. For
example, once a consumer of type B buys the product she becomes a customer loyal to
the brand and continue to make purchases of the same brand, while consumers of type






















Figure 4: The optimal design when z1 = 1:7, z2 = 2. Figure (a) for the case of 
 = 1
2,
gure (b) for the case of 
 = 0:8
A may be accidental buyers. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the monopolist
completely ignores consumers of type A. Assume further that the monopolist maximizes
awareness of the brand and chooses price equal to 0. The main question is than: what is
the optimal product design such that maximizes a number of purchases by consumers of
type B?
The rst guess could be that the monopolist should completely forget about consumers
of type A and design a product as attractive as possible to consumers of type B. The rst
guess, however, turns out to be wrong for broad set of parameters. Assume for example
that homophily level of the society is low, which implies that consumers of type B are
mostly connected to consumers of type A. Hence, to spread, the information should be
able to pass through consumers of type A. A Figure 4a illustrates the optimal product
design for the case of groups of consumers of equal size (
 = 1
2) and z1 = 1:7 and z2 = 2.
Note that for  2 [0;0:39] the optimal design is such that there is a non zero probability
for consumers of type A to buy the product. The result requires low levels of homophily
and actually implies heterophily of the society. We already have seen similar answer in
the case when the monopolist prots from both types of consumers.
Probably, the more surprising result is that although society exhibits homophily it may
be optimal to make a product attractive for consumers of type A. The only requirement
is that the proportion of consumers of type A in the society should be suciently high.
A Figure 4b illustrates the optimal product design for the case when consumers of type
A constitute 80% of the population (
 = 0:8) and the expected number of neighbors are
as before z1 = 1:7 and z2 = 2. Note that  2 [0:8;1] implies that the society exhibits ho-
mophily and there is a range of  2 [0:8;0:81] such that the optimal product characteristic
w is not zero. Another surprising feature of the result is that for a suciently small  it
is optimal to construct the product more attractive to consumers of type A than B.
288 Global Cascade Phase
In previous sections we have seen what happens when WOM marketing campaign does
not trigger a global cascade of sales. This is the case for a majority of WOM campaigns.
However, WOM campaigns such as diusion of Hotmail accounts and \The Blair Witch
Project" (tiny budget movie) were so successful that a considerable fraction of the popu-
lation became aware of the product. In this cases we can no longer apply techniques from
the previous analysis.
So let us assume that conditions are such that a global cascade of sales arises, by
Lemma 2 this happens when z2
z1 > 1
1 P minf2; 1g. To determine the fraction of the
population that buys the product we turn back to generating functions. However instead
of looking on the distribution of sizes of cascades we would like to estimate a fractional
size of a global cascade. Assume that by following randomly chosen link we arrive to a
consumer of type i. Lets denote by ui the probability that this consumer does not buy
the product. This happens if a consumer does not like the product or price, which occurs
with the probability 1  qi or if she likes it, but has not heard about it. We can write the
system of self-consistency conditions for ui as the following:





AuA + (1   A)uBk 1





BuB + (1   B)uAk 1
In terms of generating functions system is:
uA = 1   ^ FA
1 (1;1) + ^ FA
1 (uA;uB)
uB = 1   ^ FB
1 (1;1) + ^ FB
1 (uA;uB)
Having at hand uA and uB we can nd probabilities that a randomly chosen consumer
of type i does not form a part of a global cascade. These probabilities are dierent from uA
and uB, due to the dierence of degree distributions of a randomly selected and neighboring
node. Note that the probability that a randomly chosen consumer does not have links to
a giant component of buyers is equal to Fi
0(uA;uB). Thus a randomly selected consumer
does not buy the product with the probabilities:
vA = 1   FA
0 (1;1) + FA
0 (uA;uB)
vB = 1   FB
0 (1;1) + FB
0 (uA;uB)
Calculating the linear combination with weights equal to proportions of consumer of
type A and B in the society and subtracting from 1 we obtain the probability that a













uA = 1   ^ FA
1 (1;1) + ^ FA
1 (uA;uB)
uB = 1   ^ FB
1 (1;1) + ^ FB
1 (uA;uB)

(1   A) = (1   
)(1   B)
Note that the last expression insures that a number of links going from consumers of
type A to consumers of type B equals to the number of links going from consumers of
type B to consumers of type A. Since we choose 
, A and B exogenously we can assume
that the condition holds.
As in the previous analysis we assume that there are equal proportions of consumers
of type A and type B in the population (
 = 1
2). This in turn implies that A = B = 
and the maximization problem of monopolist is summarized by the following lemma:






qA[1   G0(x)] + qB[1   G0(y)]

s.t.: x = 1   qA[1   ^ G1(x)]   (1   )qB[1   ^ G1(y)]
y = 1   (1   )qA[1   ^ G1(x)]   qB[1   ^ G1(y)]
0  qA;qB;x;y  1
where x = AuA + (1   A)uB is the probability that a randomly chosen link of a
consumer of type A leads to a giant component of buyers and y = BuB + (1   B)uA
is the same for consumers of type B. In addition G0(x) =
P1
k=0 p(k)xk and ^ G1(x) =
P1
k=0 (k)xk 1. Proof See appendix 






[1   wG0(x)   (1   w)G0(y)]
s.t.: x = 1   (1   P)

w[1   ^ G1(x)] + (1   )(1   w)[1   ^ G1(y)]

y = 1   (1   P)

(1   )w[1   ^ G1(x)] + (1   w)[1   ^ G1(y)]

0  w;x;y  1
A solution to the maximization problem is characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 10. In the case when population is divided into two equally sized groups,

 = 1
2, for any degree distribution following hold:
30 For  < 1
2, w = 1
2 is a local maximum, which gives higher prots than w 2 f0;1g.
 For  > 1
2, w = f0;1g are local maxima, which give higher prots than w = 1
2.
 For  = 1
2, the interval [0;1] is the solution to the problem.
The Proposition 10 indicates that the optimal design of the product has the same
structural form as in the case where there is no global cascade of sales.
9 Conclusion
The importance of a word of mouth communication for a company's performance is well
documented by a growing number of research. However, success of a WOM marketing
campaign varies enormously between product categories and within. We show that a high
variation in the performance of WOM campaigns can be explained by dierent homophily
levels of a consumer network towards dierent products.
A key innovation of our paper is two-fold. First, we enrich a network structure by
incorporating notion of homophily and study its impact on the optimal strategies of the
monopolist. Second, the monopolist is allowed to construct a message to the network
by choosing the design of product. We found a number of results: (i) for low levels
of homophily the product, designed to attract both types of consumers is preferred to
specialized products, even if there is no cost of producing more than one product; (ii) a
price elasticity of demand is higher for products towards, which consumer network exhibits
higher levels of homophily; (iii) a social welfare is increasing in homophily level; and (iv) a
product designed to attract two types of consumers may be optimal even if the monopolist
benets only from one type.
Flexibility of the model allows us to outline several avenues for future research. The
rst one consists in introduction of in
uencers, consumers whose opinion aect opinion of
many others. In the extension we want to match two observations: in
uencers on average
enjoy higher average degree and their proportion in the population is small. The extension
aimed to study the impact of homophily on information spreading in a network of \hub-
and-spoke" type and the eect of presence of hubs on the optimal design of the product
and price. In the case when society exhibits homophily in
uencers will be linked among
themselves and will constitute core with access to a large share of consumers.
In the second extension we want to consider the optimal strategy for an entrant who
faces presence of an incumbent rm on a market. We assume that a product is durable
and consumer buys it only once. Hence, the optimal strategies for the monopolist that we
have studied in the paper are optimal for incumbent rm as well. We want to study how
homophily aects the optimal product design for the entrant and its eect on a variety of
products that are produced. Finally, we plan to compare predictions of the model with
observations from real markets.
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3310 APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us nd rst what is the number of consumers of type A that buy the product if


















We can nd Hi
1x by solving linear system of self-consistency conditions:
(
HA
1x = ^ FA
1 + ^ FA
1xHA




1x = ^ FB
1xHA





1   ^ FA
1x   ^ FA
1y
  ^ FB













or in more compact way






































k (1   A)
qB
k (1   B) qB
k B
!
The number of consumers of type A who buy the product if consumer of type i nds
out about the product from one of her friends Hi
1x goes to innity when determinant of
the matrix I   ^ F0
1 goes to zero:
 = det
 
1   ^ FA
1x   ^ FA
1y
  ^ FB
1x 1   ^ FB
1y
!













34Thus we can nd the number of consumers of type A who buy the product if consumer
















































































The total number of purchases resulted from direct advertisement to a consumer of































































k (1   A)
qB
k (1   B) qB
k B
!
The resulting number of purchases resulting from advertisement to consumers of type

























Thus the number of purchases resulting from advertisement to a randomly drawn
consumer is:
35s = (
 1   
)s = (
















Assuming that the probability to purchase the product does not depend on the number
of neighbors that consumer has, namely qA
k = qA and qB
k = qB we obtain:
s = (
 1   
)s = (


























which is number of infected nodes if we




Proof of Proposition 1















We want to identify a condition such that there exists characteristic of the product w
which satises the inequality and hence the global cascade of sales may arise. To this end
we nd the minimum of the expression and check when it is less than zero. A derivative
of the expression with respect to w is  (1   P)2(z2=z1)2(1   2)(1   2w). Note that if
 < 1
2 coecient of the term w2 is positive and thus we have upward sloping parabola.
In this case function has its minimum at the point w = 1
2. Substituting to the expression
and taking positive root we obtain a condition z2=z1 > 2(1   P) 1. On the other hand,
if  > 1
2 we have downward parabola with maximum at w = 1
2 and minima on the ends
of the interval [0;1], which implies that we have cascade if  > z1
z2(1 P). Combining both
parts we arrive to the following condition: z2
z1 > 1
(1 P) minf2; 1g.
Note that the condition on network structure becomes less restrictive when price de-
creases. Thus if price is a part of decision process the monopolist can achieve highest
diusion when P = 0 and condition becomes z2
z1 > minf2; 1g.
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting constraints to the objective function and deriving with respect to w we
nd:
(1   P)2 z4
1(1   2w)(1   2)(2z1 + z2(1   P)(1   2))
2(z2
1   z1z2(1   P)   wz2
2(1   P)2(1   w)(1   2))2
36A denominator of the condition is always positive and thus sign depends on the nu-
merator. Recall that we assume that we are in sub-critical phase with z2
z1 < 2(1   P) 1
and thus term 2z1 + z2(1   P)(1   2) is always positive. The sign of the condition de-
pends exclusively on values of  and w. Namely if  < 1
2 derivative is positive for w < 1
2
and negative afterwards. Thus, we can conclude that for  < 1
2 objective function has
unique maximum at the point w = 1
2. In the case when  > 1
2 results are reversed and the
objective function has its minimum at a point w = 1
2 and maxima lie on the boundaries,
namely w 2 f0;1g. If  = 1
2 all interval [0;1] satises rst order condition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We analyze the second part of the functional form of demand. Results for the rst
part can be obtained by substituting  = 1









1(2z1   z2(1   P))








(z1   (1   P)z2)3 > 0
It is positive since by condition of no global cascade from Lemma 2 we know that




(z1 (1 P)z2)3, which is negative.











z1   (1   P)z2
 
1
z1 + (1   P)(z12   z2)






1z2P(1   P)2(z12   z2)2 + z5
1P
(z1   (1   P)z2)2(z1   (1   P)z2 + z2
1(1   P))2 > 0






2(z1   (1   P)z2)2 > 0
Thus for  > 1
2 function is increasing in .
37Proof of Proposition 4
Price is decreasing in the homophily level
The rst order condition for P is:
(1   2P)z2
1   (1   P)z1[(1   P)z2 + (1   3P)(z2   z2
1)]
2(z1   (1   P)z2)2  
 
(1   P)2(1   2P)(z2
1   z2)z22
2(z1   (1   P)z2)2 = 0
Let us xing expected number of friends z1 and z2 and call expression on the left hand





(z1   (1   P)z2)4 > 0
It is positive since by conditions of no giant component we have z1 > z2. Thus function




and F(1;) =  1
2. The rst derivative with respect to P is negative at 0:
F0
P(0;) =  1  
z2
1(2z1   z2)
(z1   z2)2 < 0
If F(P;) is convex in P, positive at 0 and negative at 1, we can conclude that function
should intersect x-axis from above on the interval [0;1]. Hence, the derivative of the F(P;)
evaluated for the optimal price P = P is negative, @





2(2z1 z2)2 > 0, which implies that the optimal price is always less
than 1






(1   P)2z2   (1   3P)z1

2(z1   (1   P)z2)3
The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brackets. The
derivative is negative if P > 1   3z1
2z2. By the condition of no giant component we know
that z2
z1 < 1
 and thus 1   z1
z2 is negative. Since price is positive we can safely conclude
that P > 1   z1
z2 > 1   3z1
2z2. This implies that derivative of the expression is negative.












Taking into account that F0
P(P;) < 0 and F0
(P;) < 0 we can conclude that @P
@
is negative and consequently the optimal price P is decreasing in .
Prots are increasing in the level of homophily
38Lets take two levels of homophily 2 > 1. By the Proposition 3 we know that for any
xed price P following holds Q(P;2;z1;z2) > Q(P;1;z1;z2). Thus for any given price P
the same is true for prots, namely PQ(P;2;z1;z2) > PQ(P;1;z1;z2). Assume further
that P
1 is optimal price for 1. The previous result states that (2;P
1) > (1;P
1) and






Proof of Proposition 7
A derivative of sales function with respect to product characteristic is given by:
s0(w) = (1   P)

1 + z1(1   P)(1   3   (1   2)[w2(1   P)z1 + 2w(1   (1   P)z1) + (1   P)z1])
(1   wz2
1(1   P)2(1   2)(1   w)   z1(1   P))2
Note that the denominator is always positive. It is easy to verify that for  > 1
2 all
terms in the numerator involving w are positive too. Thus if we prove that s0(0) > 0 then
the derivative of sales function with respect to w is positive on the whole interval [0;1] and
we can conclude that the optimal design is w = 1. Substituting w = 0 into the derivative
and taking into account that z1 < 1
(1 P) we have:
s0(0) =
1 + (1   P)z1(1   2)
1   (1   P)z1
= 1 +
(1   P)z1(1   )
1   (1   P)z1
> 0
Thus for  > 1
2 characteristic w = 1 is the solution to the problem.
When  < 1
2 then all terms involving w are negative and numerator is decreasing
function in w. Thus numerator has its minimum at w = 1 and condition for s0(w) > 0 on
the interval w 2 [0;1] is simply s0(1) > 0. This in turn implies that if w = 1 is maximum
it is also the global maximum. The derivative at 1 is greater than zero if:
 2(1   P)2z2
12 + z1(1   P + 3(1   P)2z1) + 1   (1   P)z1   (1   P)2z2
1 > 0















9   2z1(1   P) + (1   P)2z12
4(1   P)z1











Combining the previous condition with the case of  > 1
2, we know that w = 1 is
solution if:






9   2z1(1   P) + (1   P)2z12
4(1   P)z1
On the other hand for  < ^ T(z1;P) there is an interior solution which is given by:
w =   
1   2  
p
(1   )(1   2)(1   (1   P)z1)[2 + (1   P)z1(1   2)]
(1   P)z1(1   2)
It is interesting to note that w = 1




(2 (1 P)z1)(2+(1 P)z1(1 2)) > 0, which implies that w > 1
2.
Proof of Proposition 8
Lets denote by  = z2
z1 and by (w) the following polynom:
(w) = 1   (1   P)2w(1   wr)
1
r2(1   2)   (1   P)






The global cascade of sales occurs if there is  w such that (  w)  0. One can readily
obtain condition for . We just need to take the derivative with respect to  and to show
that it is negative. Thus there is the global cascade of sales if  > ^ (;r), where
^ (;r) = min
0w1





w + (1   wr)
1
r(1   2w(1   P))

From the previous analysis we know that candidates for maxima are extreme values




r. Evaluating polynomial at 0 we have

















r + (1   P)(1   2)
i
From the rst condition we can conclude that if  > 1
 then there is global cascade.
From the second we see that if  > 2
1





cascade of sales arises. Lets consider a case when  > 2
1





40From the rst condition we know that there is global cascade if  > 1
(1 P) thus to insure








(1   P) + 2
1 r
r  1 >  1
1
2




















There is the global cascade if the former condition holds. However, we have assumed
that  > 2
1







Thus we have shown that if  > 2
1
r there is global cascade independently of the homophily
level .
Proof of Proposition 9
For the case of Poisson degree distribution size of sales cascade is given by:
s(w;P;r;z1) =
(1   P)(w + (1   wr)
1
r(1 + 2wz1(1   P)(1   2)))
2(1   (1   P)z1(w + (1   wr)
1
r( + wz1(1   P)(1   2))))
The product characteristic w = 0 is global maximum if for any w, s(0)  s(w):
1   P
2(1   z1(1   P))

(1   P)(w + (1   wr)
1
r(1 + 2wz1(1   P)(1   2)))
2(1   (1   P)z1(w + (1   wr)
1
r( + wz1(1   P)(1   2))))
since 1   P  0 by denition, we have
1
2(1   z1(1   P))
 
(w + (1   wr)
1
r(1 + 2wz1(1   P)(1   2)))
2(1   (1   P)z1(w + (1   wr)
1
r( + wz1(1   P)(1   2))))
 0
Note further that denominators of two fractions are positive due to condition of no
global cascade, thus the sign of the expression depends on the numerator of combined
terms, which is:
41 4(1   P)2w(1   wr)
1
rz2
12 + 4(1   P)w(1   wr)
1
rz1(1 + (1   P)z1)+
+1   w   (1   wr)
1
r(1 + (1   P)wz1(2 + (1   P)z1))  0
Note that expression describes downward sloping parabola and thus our condition will











































The condition should hold for all w and thus we should nd the maximum of 1 and
the minimum of 2. In order to do this we should identify maximum and minimum of the
term with w. Taking derivative of this term with respect to w we have:
 
(1   wr)  1+r
r
h
(1   2wr) +











can be proved that for r < 1,  (1   2wr) 














r and maxima lay at
borders.
















Since z1  2
1









<  < 1
On the other hand for r > 1, one can show that w = 0 is never a solution. Lets







(1   P)(1 + (1   P)z1(1   2))2
2(1   (1   P)z1])2 > 0
42It is always positive which implies that w = 0 is never solution for r > 1.














r   (1   P)z1

(1   P)(w + (1   wr)
1
r(1 + 2wz1(1   P)(1   2)))
2(1   (1   P)z1(w + (1   wr)
1
r( + wz1(1   P)(1   2))))
The denominators are positive due to no global cascade condition and thus sign of the
expression depends on the numerator of combined fraction, which is:
 2(1   P)(w + (1   2
1+r
r w)(1   wr)
1
r)z1 + 2   (2   2wr)
1
r+
+(1   P)(1   2
1+r




r   (1   P)z1)  0





Thus to prove that it has downward slope we should prove that the minimum of the term
w + (1   2
r+1
r w)(1   wr)
1
r is greater or equal to 0. The rst derivative is:
1   2
1+r





















r (1   2wr)(1   wr)
1 r
r > 0 and term w (1 r)(1   wr)
1 r
r > 1 (by properties of









0 and term w (1 r)(1 wr)
1 r





where the expression equals to zero. Thus the line has negative slope. And condition
becomes:









r(w + (1   wr)
1
r)   2
z1(1   P)(w + (1   2
r+1




we can show that for r < 1 the expression with w has its maxima on the borders and









The case when r > 1
Lets rewrite the expression (4):
1   (2
1+r
r (1   2wr) + wr 1)(1   wr)
1 r
r








r, minf(1   wr)
1 r





r (1   2wr) + wr 1)g = 2
1 r
r . Thus minimum of the product of two terms















r (1   2wr) + wr 1)g = 2
1 r
r , which implies that






This leads us again to the condition:









r(w + (1   wr)
1
r)   2
z1(1   P)(w + (1   2
r+1









r. Note that condition ^ 1 6= ^ 2 since we optimize for dierent values of r. If




r ;1), since as we have seen w = 1 is always not
optimal for the case of r > 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let us denote by x = uA+(1 )uB and by y = uB +(1 )uA than we can rewrite
system of equations as following:
s = 
qA + (1   
)qB   
qAG0[x]   (1   
)qBG0[y]
uA = 1   qA + qA ^ G1[x]
uB = 1   qB + qB ^ G1[y]
Or equivalently:
s = 
qA + (1   
)qB   
qAG0[x]   (1   
)qBG0[y]
x = [(1   qA) + qA ^ G1(x)] + (1   )[(1   qB) + qB ^ G1(y)]
y = [(1   qB) + qB ^ G1(y)] + (1   )[(1   qA) + qA ^ G1(x)]
Substituting 
 = 1






qA + qB   qAG0(x)   qBG0(y)

s.t.
44x = 1   qA   (1   )qB + qA ^ G1(x) + (1   )qB ^ G1(y)
y = 1   (1   )qA   qB + (1   )qA ^ G1(x) + qB ^ G1(y)
Proof of Proposition 10










The derivatives of constraints with respect to w are following:
@x
@w


















The case when rm's action has no eect.
Interesting case arises when  = 1
2. It seems that w has no eect on the size of global
cascade of sales . Substituting  = 1
2 we can rewrite the problem as following:
max
w




2w ^ G1(x) + 1
2(1   w) ^ G1(y)
y = 1
2 + 1
2w ^ G1(x) + 1
2(1   w) ^ G1(y)
0  w  1;0  x  1;0  y  1
Note that in this case x = y for any w. This implies that maximization problem of the
monopolist in the case of  = 1








0  x  1
45Thus eventual outbreak is the same for all values of w and moreover it's size is equal
to the giant component of connected consumers.
The case when specialized design is optimal.
We want to check when it is optimal to focus on the rst group or equivalently when
w = 1 is the solution. Note that w = 1 is corner solution that is why it is enough to show









+ G0(y) > 0
s.t.
x = 1    +  ^ G1(x)
y =  + (1   ) ^ G1(x)
The derivative of rst constraint with respect to w is:
@x
@w









1   2 +  ^ G1(x)   (1   ) ^ G1(y)
1    ^ G0
1(x)
Substituting it to the maximization problem we obtain:
G0(y)   G0(x)   G0
0(x)
1   2 +  ^ G1(x)   (1   ) ^ G1(y)




x = 1    +  ^ G1(x)
y =  + (1   ) ^ G1(x)
Let us rewrite the rst equation as:
[G0(y)   G0(x)] + G0
0(x)
(1   ^ G1(x))   (1   )[1   ^ G1(y)]
1    ^ G0
1(x)
 0
The rst term is non-negative when y  x and the condition is following:
 + (1   ) ^ G1(x)  1    +  ^ G1(x)
(2   1)[1   ^ G1(x)]  0
since ^ G1(x)  1 for all x 2 [0;1] the condition is   1
2.
46The same happens with the second term when  > 1
2. Note that  > 1
2 implies that
^ G1[x] < ^ G1[y] consequently 1  ^ G1[x] > 1  ^ G1[y]. Multiplying both sides by  and taking
into account that   1    for   1
2 we have:
[1   ^ G1(x)]  [1   ^ G1(y)]  (1   )[1   ^ G1(y)]
Thus we have proved that w = 1 is locally optimal if  > 1
2 independently of degree
distribution.
The case when symmetric design is optimal
The symmetric design w = 1























 ^ G1(x) +
1
2








































Moreover it is possible to show (it should be) that system of equations for x and y has



















The rst solution to the FOC equation is G0
0(x) = 0 which implies x = 0. This


























1   2   ^ G1(x) + 2 ^ G1(x)    ^ G1(x) ^ G0
1(x) +  ^ G0
1(x) + 1














1   2   ^ G1(x) + 2 ^ G1(x)    ^ G1(x) ^ G0
1(x) +  ^ G0
1(x) + 1

























This implies that w = 1
2 is always the critical point. What is left to proof is that it is
maximum when  < 1
2.




























SOC when w = 1
2
 
4z(1   2)(1   ^ G1(x))

2   ^ G0
1(x)









1(x)2 + 2 ^ G0
1(x) + ^ G00
1(x)(1   ^ G1(x))

^ G1(x) + 8 ^ G1(x) + (1   2)







Thus we can conclude that w = 1
2 is local maximum for  < 1
2 if:










Let us denote by F(x) = 1
2 + 1
2 ^ G1(x) then solution to equation x is such that F(x)
crosses 45 degree line in x from above since F(0) = 1
2 Thus we can conclude that F0(x) <
1. Thus 1
2 ^ G0
1(x) < 1 and consequently ^ G0
1(x) < 2, which in turn implies that our condition
always holds.
When w = 1
2 should be preferred to w = 1?
Recall that in the case when w = 1































b = 1    +  ^ G1(x
b)
Due to the monotonicity of the G0(x) we know that S(1
2) > S(1) whenever x
m < x
b.
So basically we should see how  aects solution to xed point problem, since rst equation
is just particular case of the second. Using IFT we have:
@x
@







1   ^ G1(x)
1    ^ G0
1(x)
Note that x is solution to xed point of 1    +  ^ G1(x) at x it should cross the 45
degree line and this in turn implies that  ^ G0
1(x) < 1 thus we have shown that @x
@ < 0.
Thus in turn implies that if  < 1
2 x
b > x
m and thus S(1
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